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ABSTRACT

Democracy in China Since Tiananmen: Elite Choice in Historical Context (August 2021)
Agustin Clayton Miranda, B.A., University of Texas at Austin;
Co-Chairs of Committee: Dr. Jack C. Byham
Dr. Abigail Meert

Why has the modern Peoples Republic of China not democratized? Since the late 20th
century, scholarly consensus has acknowledged a process of waves of democratization occurring
globally since the early 19th century, and yet the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has remained
mostly unmoved and aloof to these changes. This work seeks to understand why the PRC has not
democratized since the opening-up of the nation and its markets under Deng Xiaoping after Mao.
To answer these questions on democratic resistance the work highlights the evolving logic
of the PRC’s system and its leadership since the 1980s. As I argue, the central focus on stability
within the PRC provides insight into Chinese resistance to democracy. To do this the work applies
theories of democratization to three important historical moments related to Beijing’s treatment of
Hong Kong, a once democratic enclave within the nation and its relationship to the driving
leadership of each era. What is shown is that the modern PRC’s refusal of democratization revolves
around two central factors: the decisions of Chinese elites, who have increasingly sought
authoritative control in the name of stability, and the popular indifference of ordinary Chinese
citizens, for whom access to political discourse is severely limited and recent economic prosperity
has by and large quieted the demand and discussion of Western politics.
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The findings suggest that the PRC is now less likely than it has been in decades to
democratize, and the that the nation has seen the rise authoritarian and centralized control steadily
increasing under Xi Jinping to levels that have not been seen since the Maoist era.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Why has the modern Peoples Republic of China not democratized? Since the late 20th
century scholarly consensus describes a process of democratization that has occurred globally in
three waves. The first wave lasted from 1826 to 1926 within Europe and the United states with
the “expansion of suffrage.” The second, from 1943 to 1962, after “allied occupation in World
War II, British colonial independence, and within Latin America.” And the third, from 1974 to
1999, with worldwide democratization that caused “the number of electoral democracies to grow
from roughly one-fourth to nearly two-thirds of all countries.” Yet, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) remains mostly unmoved and aloof to these changes.1
How are we to interpret this resistance? Have the Chinese discovered shortcomings of
democratic systems, or is there something “wrong” with China? Francis Fukuyama elegantly
argued in 1992 that the world wars and subsequent Cold War forced Europeans to “question the
universality of their own ideals,” and that “clearest manifestations of this pessimism was the
almost universal belief in the permanence of a vigorous, communist-totalitarian alternative to
Western liberal democracy.” While the idea on the permanence of communism eroded after the
Soviet Collapse the questioning of the universality of European ideal of liberal democracy has
remained. Though Fukuyama did briefly acknowledge the argument that “where communist
totalitarianism fails to survive, it will simply be replaced by nationalist authoritarianism.” He
specifically argued within the case of China, that the country “lacks internal legitimacy for a
broad sector of its own elite…is not guided by a coherent ideology,” and that it “will no longer
serve as a model for revolutionaries around the world, as it once did under Mao, all the more so

1

Kauffman, Craig M. “Democratization,” 2018. https://www.britannica.com/topic/democratization, 1-2.

This thesis follows the model of University of Chicago Press.
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when it is compared to the fast-growing capitalist states of the region.” Further, he argued that
“China has become just another Asian authoritarian state,” and alluded that it will likely follow
in suit of the other authoritarian states of the old Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as “eventually
having to confront the fact that they have no long-term source of legitimacy, and no good
formula for solving the long-term economic and political problems they will face.” Yet, even
with Fukuyama’s deep understanding of China’s history, transitions in political ideology, and
unique aspects of the country’s authoritative nature within 1992, the nation’s future so far has
eluded this prediction. This is because three decades later and not only has China continued to
refuse to democratize, but it has become an economic global driving force with the second
highest GDP of any country, falling behind only the United States.
What happened in these three decades, and what can they tell us about democracy and the
modern Chinese system? 2 While as a Western myself I am naturally inclined to a bias in favor of
democracy, I argue that in our repulsion and blatant dismissal of that which is not democratic we
have failed to ask the larger question. What are we truly asking of China when we ask why they
have not democratized? Where it is easy to simply assume China is not democratic because the
current powers at be refuse democracy, I argue that is form of dismissal. It is dismissal because it
silently reinstates the supposed supremacy of democracy without even the acknowledgement of
the diverse situations or systems outside its own, chalking up the entire argument to “it’s because
the other system is corrupt or inept.” As I alluded prior, I am an advocate of democracy, but I
believe this form of dismissive thinking does far more harm than good.

2

Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. (London: Penguin, 1992), 7-8,34,36-37.
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The intent of this work is neither to demonize political systems nor advocate antidemocratic regimes and rhetoric, but to reveal why the PRC has not democratized. I believe this
can be explained using theories of democratization drawn from the field of political science;
these theories shed light on CCP’s evolving goal-oriented emphasis on stability of the nation and
the party since the 1980s. To illustrate and explain China’s resistance to democracy I focus on
three historical moments related to the treatment of Hong Kong, a once democratic enclave
within the nation, and its relationship to the driving leadership of each era. Hong Kong, a region
of stark political dispute long prior to its hand over in 1997, showcases the shift in strategic
Chinese political actions. I specifically denote “actions” for two primary reasons. First, I argue
that rhetoric, especially within the case of governing political bodies, is not as direct or
foretelling of the reality of the situation. Hence, for the sake of this work what matters more is
not what a government or institutional body says, but rather what it does.3 Second, by looking at
the actions taken across three central historical moments since the 1980s this work will show the
reality of the CCP’s decision making process and, in particular, that of elites within the party on
not only the democratization within the PRC but their process when given control over an
already democratic enclave. Thus, in order to identify the democratic trends within these
historical moments this work will turn to democratization theory in search of a general
framework. The intent of this work is to highlight the evolving logic of the PRC’s system and its
leadership over the decades through its central focus on stability; as I argue that this evolving
understanding of stability within the PRC will provide insight into their resistance of democracy.

3

This can be commonly understood as the De Facto and De Jure conceptions in law; there is a difference between
what happens in reality versus and what is recognized in law irrespective of reality. As it is with law, so it is with
rhetoric.
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CHAPTER II: THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION
First and foremost, before this work is to address democratization theory, I believe it is
important to define what I mean by democracy. Though contrived within may forms, for the sake
of this work democracy will be consigned to Joseph A. Schumpeter’s definition as an
“institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by
making the people itself decide issues through the elections of individual who are to assemble in
order to carry out its will.”4 The intent of this definition is to establish it as a “safe” middleground amongst the endless discourse of the subject, as it is not the objective of this work to add
to that intricate discussion.5
Theories of democratization fall into a wide range of broad categories. These theories
seek to cover aspects like “modes of democratic transitions,” “defining democratic
consolidation,” explain means of the democratization process itself, and more.6 One category for
example, as mentioned prior, is that it is commonly understood within the research that
democratization and its reverse has occurred globally and in waves. These waves, beginning with
the first wave from 1826 to 1926 until the most recent beginning in 1974, have commonly been
through pacts of countries or regions either becoming democratic, authoritarian, or most recently
a hybrid of the two. Additional, research has been apt to acknowledge there is “no consensus on
where to mark the beginning and end points of the democratization process,” or that it is to be
expected that regimes on an individual level are in themselves unique, in that internal

4

Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy. (London and New York, Routledge, 2003), 250.
Additionally, I believe it is apt to readily acknowledge early on that this work will not, nor does it have the intent
to, attempt settle or dispute the broad debate between the legitimacy of democracy over any other forms of
government; particularly within this case socialism with Chinese characteristics. As I have already established,
though I am an advocate of democracy.
6
(Kauffman, 2018, 2-6.)
5
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relationships of structures, cultures, people, etc. will differently influence every regime. Thus, as
each regime and their influences are unique there is a myriad of literature on regional, cultural,
and structural explanations when it comes to the democratization process.7
There are however, select trends within these regimes that democratization theory has
acknowledged that have helped to guide the scholarship. For example, there are two main
approaches of the democratization process itself, “one that emphasizes favorable structural
conditions and another that stresses elite choice.” While these two approaches do not necessarily
neatly categorize the regime structures themselves, rather instead helping to highlight the most
significant influencers over democratization within, they are still important. For example elite
choice, which is the more direct process of the two, emphasizes the importance of political elites
of regimes and the central influence within their decisions for democratization; in general,
research shows that elite choose democratization when it best suits them. Structural conditions
on the other hand are more nuanced. This explanatory framework is nuanced because it
emphasizes the importance of internal and external aspects of regimes, like economic
development, political culture, civil society, institutions, and more. The differences of these two
processes – elite choice and structural conditions - does not mean that they are mutually
exclusive; elites and economic development can play significant parts within the same regime.
Further, though these processes are used as general guidance to focus on the most important
influencers within regimes, it is also important to acknowledge that the regimes themselves, like
all organizations, are not static. They are not static in that they are also influenced and changed
by the stimulus around them, and thus it is not impossible but rathe more likely that central

7

(Kauffman, 2018, 1-2.)
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influencers within a regime, be they elite based, institution based, or any other, shift throughout
time. 8
Elite choice and structural conditions however are not the only means of categorization
within democratization theory. As while they are both important tools within the scholarship they
will not be the only democratic trends used within this work. For example, within a separate
branch of the scholarship, it is general accepted means of categorization to label authoritarian
regimes as “military regime,” “hegemonic party or single-party regime,” and “personalistic
regime.”9 Each of these categorizations are fairly straight forward, military regime headed by a
professional military, single party being led by an unopposed central state party, and
personalistic lead by a central key leader. While each of these categorizations similar in being
authoritative regimes, each are in fact unique in the democratization trends. For example, while
military regimes might be considered fragile within the realm of resisting “poor economic
performance,” that is not the case for single party regimes who are argued to be much more
“robust.”10 Quite important however, is the acknowledgement that even within these
straightforward categorizations scholarship acknowledges that there can be “amalgams of the
pure types.”11 Hence, just like elite choice and structural conditions, there can mixed and
matched combinations of even the three primary types, - military, hegemonic, and single partyas well as mixed and matched types that shift over time throughout the life of the regime.
For the sake of this work, as democratization theory offers a broad range of explanatory
framework when viewing these regimes, I intend to attribute elements within the theory that I

8

(Kauffman, 2018, 6-7, 8-13.)
Geddes, Barbara. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political
Science 2, no. 1 (1999), 121.
10
(Ibid, 135.)
11
(Ibid, 121.)
9
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argue are best fit to understanding the unique makeup and historical shifts of the PRC since the
1980s. As I argue that applying these selective elements within democratization theory three key
points revolving around the populace, economy, and regime type will show themselves to be the
significant reasons why the PRC has not democratized.
Before this work can cover democratic trends at play within the PRC however, it is
important to understand that nominally China does have democratic institutions and a democratic
populace. They are however severely limited as the Chinese populace’s roles and the actual
impact of the institutions can often be misleading. More specifically, any democratic institution
within the PRC, beyond the lower provincial levels, is merely rhetoric and has no substantial
impact to the actions taken by the party. For example, since the electoral changes established in
the late 1970s democratic processes have been nominally established within the PRC system. I
state nominally as the democratic processes are comprised of direct elections only within smaller
provinces, however even these are limited as though they are open elections local party influence
and election committees often gate keep the process. Though this has been a target of anticorruption legislation by Beijing, as they intend for these elections to lesson corruption and state
interference on provincial lower levels, interference remains.
At a higher, state level, however, the closest system to democracy within the PRC would
be that of the National People’s Congress or (NPC). This body could most closely be understood
as akin to that of a “representative democracy” as its membership is comprised of officials and
part-time legislators from all over the PRC; each member representing for the nation’s different
political bodies.12 It is important to note, however, the stark distinctions between this

12

Pu, Xingzu. 2005. “Democratization of the National People’s Congress as the focal point for the continued
advancement of China democratic development.” In Democracy and the Rule of Law in China, edited by Yu
Keping. (Leiden: Brill Press, 2010), 135.
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arrangement and what we would call Western representative democracy. First, its membership is
more than 2/3 comprised directly of the Communist Party with the other political bodies
swearing subservience under their leadership, hence voting dispute in legislation is generally
unheard-of. Second, membership is based on an internal tier-based election system decided by
electorates from their regions, with each region varying widely on its means of electorate voting.
Third, though the committee is further subdivided into the top membership under National
People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) and has the constitutional backing to act over
the government in all forms of policy or ruling, the de-facto reality is that it is often equated to
that of a “rubber stamp” committee.13 It is equated as a rubber stamp committee in the sense that
it functions as the de-jure means through which top officials and leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party or CCP to pass their larger legislation.14 Further, this fact is compounded by
the committee’s size of 2,270 members who only converge once every five years, hence “rarely,
if at all, is anything of consequence seriously debated.”15 As a result, though the NPC has the
legal authority to pass laws and make constitutional amendments, in fact it could never do so
without direct authorization or approval from CCP leadership.
Though that is not to say the NPC should be ignored, as scholarship readily
acknowledges that it severs a “symbolic function” of providing “a display of power and unity,”
both internally and externally, as well as “milestones in the party’s history.”16 This is in
combination with the fact that the NPC constitutionally serves as the closest basis for the
representation of the general Chinese populace within Beijing, hence an avenue some scholars

White, Lynn. “Chinese Constitutional Currents.” Modern China 36, no. 1 (2010), 103.
Occasionally also referred to as the Communist Party of China or CPC interchangeably outside of this work.
15
Saich, Anthony. The Governance and Politics of China, Fourth Edition. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 90.
16
(Ibid.)
13
14
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point to being the PRC’s largest possibility of democratization.17 Beyond the NPC’s future
possibilities however, within modernity it is safe to say it is a façade of broad public
representation within the government. It is important therefore to acknowledge that the average
Chinese individual does not have means of institutional representation within the PRC.
Outside of further discussion of the institutions themselves, it is also imperative to turn to
the perceptions of the nominally democratic Chinese populace on politics. Rather, due to the
minimal representation of the Chinese populace these institutions constitute the average Chinese
person generally understands that the power is within the party and simply chose to stay
apolitical. Unlike Western democracies public discussion on politics within the PRC, with the
exception of nationalist rhetoric, is heavily censored and quite taboo; as all know it can lead to
trouble if it is not behind closed doors.18 Additionally, since the Deng’s reforms in the 1980s the
Maoist expectation of universal “participation” of political campaigns for those outside the CCP
has been generally removed.19 Thus, not only is the general populaces weakly incentivized to be
informed of politics, as unless the open discussion on central policy is on the general agreement
of its implementation it is normally not discussed, but rather instead a “rational ignorance” is
pushed.20 Coined by Anthony Downs in 1957 to explain voter ignorance, “rational ignorance”
refers to purposefully remaining ignorant on a topic because the cost of being informed is higher
than its possible benefits.21 As it is the general perspective taken by the Chinese populace it is
important to understand this broad acceptance of rational ignorance throughout the PRC; as

17

(Pu, 2005, 123.)
On nationalism, that aspect of politics is in fact quite invigorated by the party and is often used as a tool of
patriotism and misdirection. This invigoration however sometimes backfires as patriotic protests or discussion
around the party topic swell too large for the party’s liking and effect regional stability.
19
(Saich, 2015, 28.)
20
To not be informed on politics outside of nationalist rhetoric or state mouthpieces.
21
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. (New York: Harper, 1957.) 244-46, 266-71.
18
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without this understanding it is easy to mistakenly impart a Western stance on individualistic
representation on political ideology. Or rather, if not careful, it could be easy to wrongly assume
there is broader or more open political discussions and debates within the PRC than there are in
reality.
It is therefore imperative to understand that this rational ignorance is commonly accepted
within the general populace simply as the party knowing what is best for the people, as the
central government are the experts. While perhaps the notion of general apolitical populace in
broad agreement with the central party is odd for some, the reality for most citizens of the PRC is
that the CCP has provided large scale stable growth since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in
the late 1970s. Hence, vast number citizens, most especially within the larger cities, have
witnessed their lives and social mobility dramatically improve over a single generation. This
improvement has left a large majority to simply stay out of politics and let the party continue to
guide the nation, with democracy or its broader implementation within the PRC not being of
central concern.
For sake of this work, it only makes further sense to focus not on the generally apolitical
masses of the PRC, who often have little care or actual sway in the decision making of the top
leadership, but instead the leadership itself. Or rather it could more accurately be described
within democratization theory as choosing to focus and emphasis on elite choice over structural
explanations like political culture and civil society of the Chinese populace. As what will come
to be shown is that lacking explanations like political culture and civil society are in fact highly
important but are directly influenced by elite choice within the PRC. Therefore, I argue the best
way to understand this elite choice is to follow their actions over the passing decades, with
central focus on large scale influential historical shifts.

11

Turning back to democratization theory, the work now looks at the three most relevant
democratic trends within the PRC. These trends look at: political culture, economic
development, and regime type of the nation. Each of these trends will be used to help recognize
and understand China’s resistance to democracy since the 1980s.The first relevant democratic
trend, and what has been partially touched on prior, revolves around the general apolitical nature
of the nation’s populace. Or rather, what could more accurately be defined within
democratization theory as a general lack of “democratic political culture or civic culture” within
the PRC.22 Though scholarship acknowledges there is no true consensus on what exact values
define these terms of “civic culture” there is general agreement that they “acknowledge the
importance of tolerance of diversity, the belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy, a
belief in reciprocity, a willingness to cooperate and compromise, a respect for freedom and
equality, and a belief that all members of society have both the right to be included in the
political system and the capacity to participate effectively.”23 While perhaps some may hear
these values and simply take them for granted, as this work has already addressed, some of these
values are quite conflicting with common expectations for the general Chinese populace. Thus,
where many democratization trends are built on the assumption that the masses in themselves are
in want of democracy and have the underpinnings of democratic political culture, it is significant
factor, that for the most part, the PRC does not.24
The second democratization trend is that it is generally accepted with the theory that there
is a strong link to economic developments correlation to democracy. This correlation is
important as this is quite contradictory within the PRC; this due to the PRC’s ability at creating
22

(Ibid, 10.)
(Ibid.)
24
Perhaps other than the limited forms of democratic systems that hold no political power, yet even hear
membership is heavily comprised of the CCP…
23
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economic freedoms and thriving business class while simultaneously restricting political
freedoms. This is because the rise of the economy is associated with the rise of middle class
which serve to stabilize “extremist positions because of their interest in the economic security
and stability” of the current regime. Similarly, the rise of economies associated with capitalism
has strong correlations with democratization as “economic freedom creates pressures for political
freedom” because private business class generate their own sperate economic interest from the
state. Overall however, it must be noted, that while there is debate within the scholarship that
questions whether the correlation between economic growth and democratization is always
positive, there is a general agreement that “although a country’s level of economic development
may not explain the timing of a democratic transition, it does determine the prospects for
consolidation once democracy is established.” Rather, democracy is more likely within a well
economically developed country; something yet to be fully seen in the PRC’s economic rise
since the late 1970s. 25
The third and last democratic trend, and one that can only be fully explained after
understanding the historical points within the work, is the unique makeup of the authoritarian
state of the PRC. As the work will show that since the shift away from the Maoist era the PRC
has been shifting to a hybrid of single party and personalistic regime due to the significant
amount of control central leadership has within the nation. That because of this hybrid and
shifting nature the trends in the systems strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of democratization
change along with it. Hence, just like how it was discussed prior that military regime is
considered fragile within the realm of resisting “poor economic performance” this would change
as the nature of the regime changes along with it; with the most accurate trends leaning towards

25

(Kauffman, 2018, 8-10.)
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what the regime at the time best represents.26 I therefore argue that by better understanding the
PRC under each of these democratization trends throughout central historical periods since the
1980s, this work will show why the nation has yet to democratize within the 21st century.
The Data: History in Context
To ascertain the PRC’s stance on democracy however, viewing modern Hong Kong in
isolation is not enough. Though one could argue that the political tensions within modern Hong
Kong go back to the 19th century Opium Wars, with the British Empire and Qing dynasty
fighting over the region’s jurisdiction, that is not the intent of the work. Instead, I will be
focusing on the within relative modernity to periods after the creation of the modern Peoples
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party.
More specifically I focus on three historic points within the PRC, divided across three
sections, that highlight dramatic shifts for the Hong Kong region and CCP as a whole. Each
section is organized in a way for the reader to, if need be, first be aware of the background of the
historical event, then coverage of the event itself, followed by significant actions taken by the
party elite within the era, and finally a synopsis of what the era represents. This is done in order
to provide a clear understanding of the historical events themselves and the place they share
within the broader coverage of the shifting eras of the PRC.
The first historical point and the only one physically outside of the Hong Kong region, is
the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. This historical point was chosen because it represents a
dramatic shift on the perspective of Hong Kong and party dynamics from opening of both

26

(Geddes, 1999, 135.)
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economic and political policy to more hardline conservatism with centered interest in the
economy. Summarized briefly, the PRC was opening up to limited extent yet hardliners in CCP
still resisted as many party members argued against what they saw as Western non-Chinese
influences that could come to undermine the party and country’s stability. Directly tied to this
was the notion that Hong Kong could serve as democratic enclave that threatened stability of
party, inevitably the massive student protests in 1989 proved hardliners right and shifted the
CCP’s rhetoric for the decade to come.
Second, is 1997 Sino-British Joint declaration handing over of Hong Kong. As the
official passing of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), the PRC’s actions around the event reflected its intent to secure the region and gain
access to international agencies. The era reflects the backlash from the 1989 and the CCPs shift
of emphasis on the stability through economy. This is especially emphasized by the PRC’s
acceptance of the “one country, two systems” motto that sought to outline the same protections
and freedoms Hongkongers had priorly under British rule, with the acknowledgment that they
would now be an official province of the PRC.
Third and last is the modern Hong Kong protests of 2019-2020.This historical point has
come to represent that the hardliner faction, under Xi Jinping, has since risen to full power. Here
the perspective of Hong Kong as a threat to faction and CCP stability over its usefulness as an
economic enclave has fully spread through those within power. Recent protests, push of more
authoritative policy, and push of rhetoric on Xi Jinping Thought highlight the current CCP’s
stance on original doctrine of “one country, two systems” motto and new emphasis of stability
through control.

15

By focusing my lens on Hong Kong, a once democratic enclave, under these three vital
moments in its history this work will show the gradual transition PRC policy and action that
reflect the reality of the CCP’s stance on democracy. More specifically, the actions over mere
rhetoric taken by the elites within nation. As what these actions will show throughout the passing
decades of PRC’s leadership is the repeated focus on the party goal of stability. This evolving
understanding of stability by the party from fear of instability, to stability through economy, and
finally stability through control will show to be the principle drivers of the nation’s top elite.
Why specifically Hong Kong as point of interest? Hong Kong provides a unique
perspective of viewing the PRC’s actions when given control over a democratic enclave. In order
to fully understand this however, it is first important to recognize that the Hong Kong region was
a democratic enclave, even under the PRC for its first decades, because of the original agreement
made in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Within this transfer of sovereignty of the region the
agreement allowed the “former British colony to keep its governmental structure, capitalist
system, and legal regime after 1997 for 50 years without converging” with the PRC.27 This
agreement was consigned as the “One Country, Two System” formula, in that it was one country
of the PRC with two governmental systems, Beijing’s and Hong Kong’s.28 What this meant for
the average citizens of Hong Kong was that they were able to enjoy the democratic freedoms that
they had prior, much akin to those we share in Western democracies, but freely be a part of PRC.
In practice however, much like under British rule, most Hongkongers chose to stay
within the region and form a unique way of life exclusive from the mainland. Hence, not only

27

Yuen, Samson, and Edmund W. Cheng. “Between High Autonomy and Sovereign Control in a Subnational Island
Jurisdiction: The Paradox of Hong Kong Under ‘One Country, Two Systems.’” Island Studies Journal 15, no. 1
(2020), 131.
28
(Ibid.)
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was the Hong Kong region a democratic enclave, in that it shared the same general democratic
principles of law as we do within the West, but that its populace is in itself unique. The populace
is unique because though it holds an ethnically majority Chinese populace, who share a direct
border with the mainland, their world values and perspectives could be described as almost
identical to those we share within the West and not like their apolitical mainland counterparts.
Hence, within democratization theory one could argue the region harbors a “democratic political
or civic culture” in which “citizens recognize and obey the authority of government elites while
also pressuring them to be responsive and accountable.”29 Further, not only does this Chinese
populace share similar Western perspectives, as a former British colony and international
economic hub, the English literacy rate is over 60% for the entire population.30 Even with these
unique distinctions what will come to show within the analysis of the historical moments
however, are that these freedoms under the one country, two systems motto were eventually
eroded and striped from the region. It is important to highlight these facts to help the reader to
understand the similarities that this district shares with the West. That because Hong Kong was
not simply “another Chinese region” it holds the unique ability that no other region at the time of
writing can show us. The ability, by simply observing their actions, to directly demonstrate the
current PRC’s capacity and intent when given authority over democracy. Hence, by looking at
the Hong Kong under these different administrations throughout the decades one can witness
first-hand the general shifts within CCP ideology on democracy.

29

(Kauffman, 2018, 11.)
Shone, John B, Kingsley Bolton, K.K Luke. “Language Use, Proficiency and Attitudes in Hong Kong” (The
University of Hong Kong, Social Sciences Research Center, 2015), 34. - Additionally, not only is the majority
multilingual, with English often as a second language to Cantonese, the youth of the region with ages 12 to 39 have
an English literacy rate over 80%, with 12 to 29 being over 90%. - Important to note that Cantonese, the official
language of the region, is in itself somewhat unique as Hong Kong is one of the principal places it is spoken as
compared to the mainland’s use of Mandarin.
30

17

Caveats and Clarifications
I believe it is important to acknowledge the primary limitations to this work, which are
three in number: the language barrier, the culture, and the nuanced history. For example, the first
limitation is my reliance on translated work from Chinese scholars, rather than originals, due to
my inability to read Mandarin. I believe however that even if I were able to read the works in
their initial form, unless highly proficient in the language the end result for this work, while
perhaps more original, would not be more accurate to official translators. Thus, though I am
admitting of possible bias coming from translated sources and have sought multiple sources on
the same topics for the very reason, I understand some readers may still take issue.
The second limitation of the work is that because it is focusing directly on the PRC’s
observable actions and rhetoric over the decades through these historical moments, it lacks the
coverage of the more nuanced topics of Chinese cultural differences when compared with the
West. While difficult to determine definitively scholarship acknowledges the influential roles
like that of Chinese tradition on cultural and moral values even within 21st century PRC. For
example, within the case of the CCP and leadership is its links to Confucianism and legitimacy.
Under this morality the relationship of state to populace is that of filial link that maintains
legitimacy as long as authority maintains stability and prosperity. This morality in turn is also a
reinforcement of the ideology that allows and legitimizes means of strict hierarchical control by
the authoritative party (parent) to manage the populace (child.) While by no means does this
morality directly dictate the modern PRC it is important to acknowledge its inescapable
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influences within the culture and institutions like that of Christianity’s cultural influences within
the West.31
Another example could be the influence of what is defined as “Guanxi” within Chinese
culture, Guanxi is best defined as a “sophisticated and economic tradition” of dynamic
“networking of outstanding personal favors and obligations stemming from town or regional ties,
school ties, and family ties.” It is influential because though this obligation is generally
“ephemeral and unpredictable” within the West, it is a more formalized aspect of Chinese
culture. It could be seen as a cultural sociological construct that plays significant role within the
inner works of the PRC as its control, even by the CCP, is “particularly tricky obstacle to
reform” and often an avid avenue for corruption.32
Within both these cases I agree they are no doubt influential to Chinese society, however,
as is the case with many nuance cultural influences on politics, they are extremely difficult to
accurately quantify over any length of time. Hence, I argue that for sake of this work, cultural
influences ephemeral nature, while important, tell us less than the observable actions that one can
witness across the passing decades within the PRC. Thus, while I understand some may question
why I do not further address the influence of cultural differences, know it is a deliberate decision
in the name of observable clarity. Further, because this work is seeking a clear understanding of
democratization and its prospects within the PRC I would argue that culture, for a populace of
1.4 billion people across the area the size of the United States arching over three decades, as
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compared to understanding the Party’s leadership would only serve to muddy the waters and be
unable to explain nuances due to overgeneralizations.
Third, though this work is written under the assumption that the reader has a nominal
understanding of the Chinese governmental system and policy, it will clarify specifics or nuances
that are perhaps lesser known outside the topics when addressed. As it would be irresponsible to
not acknowledge certain critically influential aspects that make up the modern PRC and occurred
outside the historical coverage of this work. I am specifically referring to what is commonly
referred to within PRC history and policy as the “century of humiliation.” While I will not go
into depth on the topic within the work, briefly summarized, China prior to the revolution in
1949 had suffered seemingly ceaseless defeat to foreign forces. This began as far back as the first
Opium wars in the 19th century with the British Empire until occupational demands from the
Japanese Empire in WWII. What this has come to represent is China’s fall from grace as the
middle kingdom, or center of the world. For the CCP however, this has come to represent more.
Specifically for the CCP, the century of humiliation has come to be stringently tied to the
rhetoric of nationalism and pride, as Mao declared the century over with the creation of the Party
in 1949. Hence, even today, the rhetoric of the century of humiliation is strongly associated with
the growth of the PRC, leadership of the CCP, and the retaking of its place as the middle
kingdom(state). Additionally, and just as imperative, is the understanding of century of
humiliation as a perspective within the PRC and its populace as a hyperawareness or suspicion of
dominating or meddling foreign influences, most especially Western, with the intent to stop the
PRC from reaching the aforementioned goal.
So much for the caveats. As for the clarifications, there is essentially one, which has to do
with how we are to understand the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) role within the country.
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Though constitutionally the nation is uniquely faceted as a one-party state that operates a
multiparty system of cooperation, with eight other Political parties representing different
ideologies, the De-Facto reality is that for those other parties to exist they must swear
subservience under the CCP. Thus, for all intents and purposes the PRC is a single party state
under the CCP.33
Similarly, this notion of one-party state is also the same when discussing the government
of the PRC. Though nominally separate in law, requirement for allegiance to the party for
governmental positions, and social mobility associated with it, has led to the party and
government becoming nearly indivisible. Scholarship on the subject is apt to note the
government “as tool of the party to implement policy,” and that its means as a tool of social
mobility is also tied to the party’s emphasis on loyalty to party ideology over expertise for
governmental positions. 34 Hence, by tying allegiance to the party one can gain access to
resources, both fiscal and social, that would not otherwise be possible. It is apt to note that
though originally this priority of loyalty over expertise stemmed from fear of Kuomintang or
Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) uprising after the Civil War in combination with the association
of “expert” with unwanted Western influences, emphasis on loyalty has not disappeared. 35
Rather, within modern PRC this emphasis on loyalty to party while no longer necessarily
associated directly with CNP uprising or Western expertise is still just as relevant as it is still
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linked to stability.36 Thus, as these institutional bodies and those within are nearly indivisible,
when this work mentions the PRC government or Beijing, unless noted otherwise, it is to be
understood that they are branches of the CCP.
To begin to witness these historical shifts, and their relationship to democratization, it is
critical to begin the historical coverage not right on the hand-over of the Hong Kong region in
1997, but rather in 1989 under one of the PRC’s most controversial events, the Tiananmen
Square Incident. For what this work will show is that this incident played a critical role in
shaping the party and the nation for the decades to come.
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CHAPTER III: HISTORICAL POINTS IN FOCUS
Historical Point 1: Tiananmen Square, 1989
To understand the impact of the first historical point, the Tiananmen Square Incident, it is
important to first encapsulate the political tension of 1980s PRC. I specifically speaking of the
dramatic tension that was split amongst the Chinese Communist Party. Though a relative
simplification, the party tensions were divided amounts those under the Deng Xiaoping faction
and hardliner faction. Deng Xiaoping was the prominent political leader who guided the nation
after the death of Mao and who looked to the opening and reform of the PRC predominantly
through economic means and easing of centralized planning; against opponents who saw the
unraveling of the central planning apparatus and liberalization of the markets as foreign
influences that threatened Maoist ideals and the very social fabric of the PRC.37
Party tensions became palpable to even some of those outside CCP a few years prior to
the Tiananmen Square incident. For example, political demonstrations in 1986 pushing for
reforms caused the removal of Hu Yaobang, the then current General Secretary of the
Communist Party, from his position due to party disapproval of his sympathetic attitude on the
issue. Under compromise the party then introduced Zhao Ziyang to the position of General
Secretary. Zhao’s goals had been to “remove ideology from thwarting reform and to concentrate
on improving material standards” as he had hoped to remove the party from the constraints of
“Maoist dogma” that many had come to believe held the nation back. As such Zhao targeted
what he saw as two of the greatest obstacles of their state socialism, “central planning and state
ownership.” Problems mounted however when industrial reform sought by Zhao effected
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stability of the markets due to the necessity to reform the “pricing and subsidy systems” as well.
While Zhao’s intention was the gradual reform of both economic and political spheres, as he also
called for a relative “redistribution of power” for both state and party organs, his backing began
to falter along with the economy in 1988. Due to disgruntlement from both sides, anti-reformist
angered at the faltering economy and pro-reformist angered at lack of large-scale change, the
“façade of unity” of the party began to crack. 38
It was however not until 1989 Tiananmen protests did this division fully reveal itself to
the world. State response on the issue at the time were released backing hardliner stances,
declaring the Protests as “planned conspiracy against the party,” however Zhao “opposed a tough
response” and instead favored “limited dialogue.”39 This caused the protest to continue for over a
month after official state response. By mid-May Zhao had been secretly dismissed from his
position and crack down on the protests had begun by declaration of Martial Law. These events
inevitably leading up to June 4th incident in Tiananmen square that saw the mass death of over
10,000 of the student protestors.40
Soon after the removal of Zhao and his supporter Hu Qili from the Politburo Standing
Committee, the highest political body of the CCP, Jiang Zemin was appointed as the new
General Secretary of the Party due to his “effective” response to the protests.41 The party
however was unable to escape the reality of why the Zhao’s reforms were being demanded, in
fact, “many initiatives associated with the disgraced General Secretary again became key
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elements of policy.”42 Most significant of these elements was the undeniability of economic
impediment PRC had seen with half-measure reforms, as when it came to political reform the
party, especially for the elite, were more adamant on their stance.
This attitude by the party was simultaneously adopted when viewing regions like Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Specifically within Hong Kong’s case, the involvement of Hong
Kong pro-democracy activists in the Tiananmen Incident served to “reinforce Beijing’s longstanding suspicions that the Special Administrative Region-to-be might become a sanctuary for
the Party’s enemies.” This perspective was not unique to the Jiang’s administration however,
rather even since the Mao era scholarship has acknowledged that “China’s toleration of the
British presence rested on one condition: that “dependency must not be used as a base to subvert
the Chinese Communist Party.” This dependence refers to the fact that many years the Hong
Kong served as a central hub for the closed off nation’s interaction with international bodies; for
even during the Civil war in 1949 Mao understood that the region was “useful in developing its
international relations.”43
Hong Kong
From this history of the era alone, I argue there are two main points on the significant
importance of the Hong Kong region. First, even from the beginning of the PRC, the CCP has
always been on the defense when it comes to Hong Kong due to the fear that its presence could
serve as “launch off” point for Western soft power to the nation. This is especially so as the
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PRC’s rise to economic dominance within the region after Deng has left the only other
significant “Western” soft-power influences coming from India, South Korea, Japan, and
nominally Taiwan.44 Even this is limited however, as even for India, the only nation to share a
land-border with the PRC of these mention, the vast majority of highly populated regions are
separated by Nepal as a buffer state; as for the few high populated regions that do share a border
the influence is at best only minimal further inland. Hence, except nominally for India, Hong
Kong was the only significant democratic enclave within the region to share a land border with
the PRC.45
Second, is the CCP’s constant balancing of the risks versus merits of further
democratization, and its influences, over political and economic incentive in Hong Kong. As
noted prior, even before PRC’s control of Hong Kong the regions merits as an international hub
outwaited its risks for the developing nation. What will come to pass over the coming decades
however, is the gradual shift in this decision on Hong Kong due to changing priorities of the
CCP’s administrations. For example, the shift that will come to take center stage under Jiang,
due to Deng’s influence, is the rising interest in economic merits that Hong Kong can offer. It is
only after Deng’s death however do we slowly begin to see the rise of the authoritative state with
Jiang’s political oppression of factions like Falun Gong.
The party’s perspective was not the only one to have been significantly influenced by
Tiananmen however, in fact, Hong Kong under British rule was to be substantially reshaped
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before the handover. There was indeed support of pro-democracy activists revolving around
Tiananmen, but after the subsequent crack-down by Beijing support rapidly expanded and
“brought millions on to the streets to protest against the Chinese government.”46 Fears of
witnessing the crackdown by the PRC reinvigorated the populace to push the British
administrative government to implement more policy to secure and establish Hongkongers and
the regions democratic rights, that until prior had been carefully teetering the line to please
Beijing. Combined with fear of the rise of “capital and brain drain” that had already been
plaguing the British Hong Kong government, policy began to be written. These early policies
however, though more “confrontational” than the prior “consensual” approach of the
government, still teetered “to accommodate China” with scholarship noting it as a “sort of
limited damage repair.”47 Hence, it was not until Governor Christ Pattens took office in 1992, the
last British administration, did substantial changes in policy occur that came to best reflect Hong
Kong as the full fledge democracy that we had seen until 2019.
Overall, the Tiananmen square protests established a new era for the entire region. This
historical moment encapsulates fear of loss of stability, after having central key figures within
removed and large-scale infighting that threatened the party’s role. It was with this fear that the
party acknowledged that the growth of the economy is vital to stability; a perspective that we see
not only until Deng’s last days but still ingrained under the Jiang administration. Further, on
Hong Kong, the historical moment shows the crackdown and the student support from within
Hong Kong not only reignited Hongkonger’s desire for political freedoms and their future
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security under the British rule, but caused further uneasiness from party as it proved the region
harbored a launch off point for Western soft-power. This uneasiness on Hong Kong by the party
however would come to take a backseat to the party’s growing priority of economic growth
under Deng and Jiang.
Historical Point 2: Hong Kong Handover, 1997
Before covering the handover of Hong Kong itself it is important to briefly encapsulate
the significance for the PRC on one of the most substantial historical moments of the decade; the
fall of the Soviet Union. First, though not a major discussion within this work it would be
irresponsible to not at least address the importance of the impact that the fall of the Soviet Union
had on the developing nation of the PRC. Though not confuse the late Soviet Union as close
allies to the PRC, as the relationship between the nations was never concrete, the socialist
country stood as strategic monolith throughout the entirety of the PRC’s life. The country’s mere
presence helped to shield the PRC from much of the Western world’s scrutiny during the Cold
War. In fact, scholarship acknowledges that prior to this China’s entire foreign policy was “based
on the notion that international politics would be dominated by the existence of a bipolar
relationship between the two superpowers,” a relationship that allowed the PRC to “play off one
against the other to create more space for itself in international affairs.” 48
It should therefore be noted that the political uncertainty that revolved around the fall of
the Soviet Union, both before and after the event in 1991, was of significant influence on PRC.
Within the years prior, growing Western influences, loosening of centralized state control, and
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eventually the failed August Coup under Gorbachev administration within the Soviet Union led
many to believe worldwide that democratization was winning over Soviet Communism. Though
the actual collapse came as a shock to many, as many assume the nation would slowly reshape
itself to a democratic image, democratization took center stage of world media and academia.
For many to see the Soviet Union collapse it only seemed natural for the PRC to do so unless
they changed democratically, hence we come to see both academic literature and state policy that
further reflect this mindset.
This perspective was not unanimous within the CCP, however, as for some the fall of
Soviet Union and dissolution of Communism from the Soviet bloc “proved that over-hasty, overambitious political reform could lead to domestic political instability,” thus further engraining
anti-reformist attitudes; this was especially so within the case of policies that could be interpreted
as Western values. 49 Moreover, for those warry of Western values, the fall of the Soviet
monolith not only ingrained their perspective but opened a new pathway. Because the Soviet
state failed and collapsed the PRC was now free to “unashamedly purse its own national interests
without reference to ideological considerations.”50 Or rather, state rhetoric and CCP policy was
no longer bound to Soviet and Marxist ideals, and that it “no longer became necessary to dress
up policies in socialist rhetoric” as “national interest became first and foremost.”51 Since this
shift however, though the political rhetoric may “move away from Marxism, the ideology itself
remains a crucial component of the CCP’s self-legitimation” as it grounds the party as rightful
leadership of the people.52 Thus, the fall of the Soviet Union represented the competing notions
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of global democratization, foundational ideology, and national interests in stability that will
continue to be ever present within the coming decades of the PRC.
PRC Reform
While one might assume that the events of 1989 and the Soviet’s collapse automatically
shifted the Beijing administration to a radical conservative path, economic reforms had begun to
taken center stage. Under the Jiang Zemin administration the party attempted to distance itself
from the Tiananmen incident due to international backlash and the fears of its impediment on
strategic Western diplomacy. More specifically, the PRC worried that agitating the West could
impede acceptance into global organizations, like the World Trade Organization (WTO), that had
direct benefits to the economy as well as the clean transition of Hong Kong from the United
Kingdom. This is not to assume that CCP kowtowed to the West, far from it, but rather that
many within the party, principally the Deng faction, had understood that consistent economic
growth was their root to stability and further legitimacy; thus, many accepted what some within
the party might have feared to be dominating Western influences.
Even with the hesitancy of competing influences within the party rather than to simply
refrain from doing anything that could cause ire from the West the PRC dramatically shifted
their tone, at least superficially, on the prospects for dramatic political reform. In fact, there is
much Chinese scholarship from the era of the late 1980s to early 2000s that adamantly push the
notion of the PRC’s democratization. These works range from the argument that the PRC has the
possibility of becoming democratic, to its nominal systems in place already showing its
transformation. For example, scholarship argued that from the late 1970s opening up under Deng
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until the 1982 with the Constitutional Revision, the nation made a dramatic shift in moving away
from cultural revolution of the Maoist era; the party even “officially denouncing the unremitting
class struggle, and the catastrophic consequences thereof among which were specifically
identified the decimation of the legal system, the degradation of democracy, the overall tramping
of human rights, absolute social chaos, and the overwhelming poverty of the masses.” Even
further, under the new constitution and “supplementary legislation” the new system was
“designed to restore social order, safeguard human rights, and institutionalize and legalize
democracy.” Though scholarship at the time acknowledged that “these stipulations are
incomplete, unspecific, and excessively restrictive,” they argued that the changes “constituted a
courageous theoretical breakthrough by the Chinese leadership of the time, and these remarkable
political transformations heralded the dawning of a new era of the rule of law.”53
A consistent train of thought that was shared through many of the works was that opening
of the market economy led to division of interests, which lead to individual demands, which
would then lead to political participation, and naturally democratic development.54 This
conception was portrayed as a natural “sociological chain that logically proceeds from the link
between economics and politics,” yet with modern hindsight we can see that events did not
unfold as predicted.55 Instead, both influential internal and external forces interested in the
PRC’s market economy, like the U.S President Bill Clintons’ administration’s push for the
PRC’s entry into World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 or Jiang’s allowance of private
entrepreneurs to become party members also in 2001, will eventual come to be the true
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significant factors.56 It could be understood that the allowance of Western democratic and
capitalistic rhetoric within the PRC was allowed as long as the end result improved the economy
and did not undermine the party, as stability was priority. Hence, the consistent theme of party
stability takes center stage, with the economy taking precedence early within Jiang’s
administration due to significant party pressures from Deng.
Hong Kong
During the years prior to the Hong Kong hand-over scholarship acknowledges the
significant influence of Deng Xiaoping’s perspective of the region. Specifically, Deng saw “the
separation of Hong Kong’s and mainland China’s systems as essential to the stability and
prosperity of both sides.” We can see this most especially in his later successor Jiang Zemin’s
acceptance of Hong Kong under the “One Country, Two Systems” motto, which as prior noted,
allowed for Hongkongers to keep British rule of law for 50 years after the 1997 handover.
Following under Deng, the Jiang administration accepted that “economically conductive
unification of the two under one sovereign state cannot take place unless the existing setup of
Hong Kong is conserved.”57
What is important to highlight however is the significant influence that hand-over of
Hong Kong had to the PRC’s developing economy; as though the country had been rapidly
industrializing and becoming wealthy, coastal cities like Hong Kong were the true centers of
commerce. To give a perspective, in 1999 alone Hong Kong made nearly 85 billion U.S dollars
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while the entirety of the PRC made 991 billion. Hence in that year alone Hong Kong made the
equivalent of almost 12% of the entire PRC economy. 58 While perhaps a tenth of the economy
does not sound grandiose to some, it is valuable to note Hong Kong only had around 7 million
occupants compared to the PRC’s 1.25 billion at the time. Thus, at an increase of around 1.9% of
the PRC population in the hand over, the PRC was to add to 12% to the nation’s economy.
In addition to the role of economics played by Hong Kong is the further influence of the
prior noted “century of humiliation.” For the PRC, the acquisition of Hong Kong would serve as
a large symbolic step of advancement for the CCP, as it would be under their reign that the
former Chinese region was given back to their rightful non-Western rulers. Scholarship
acknowledges that especially for Hong Kong, it was the fact that it was the first region to be
given back and hence would serve to be a “model for Macao and, even more important, for
Taiwan.” Hence, for the PRC, any means of preventing this process of acquisition were seen “as
foreign attempts to contain China and prevent it from assuming its dutiful position” as center of
the world stage.59
With this knowledge however, to what extent we can assume this acceptance of Hong
Kong under the motto of “One Country, Two Systems” was from the growth of Western
democratic influences, symbolic advancement of the party, or solely from PRC’s intent to grow
economically is not of central importance. What matters is the fact that PRC wholly accepted
these terms under the Sino-British’s agreement and continued to honor the core of the agreement,
with respects to individual rights, for near a decade.60 While I am apt to acknowledge that
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perhaps some would disagree with the statement that the mainland honored the agreement for the
decade proceeding after the handover, as there is indeed scholarship that recognizes the gradual
diminishment of exercising regional autonomy through means like “economic integration,
connective infrastructure, and legal harmonization,” one would only have to look to the mainland
to witness the drastic difference in general political freedoms.61
A prime example of this difference of autonomy can be witnessed in the Jiang’s
administration rampant crackdown of Falun Gong in 1999; a religious but politically involved
sect that had become too large and active for the party’s liking.62 Where members of the sect,
even for those within the CCP, were being detained and sent to labor camps within the mainland,
those within Hong Kong were free to practice their beliefs. Even further, not only were those
within Hong Kong able to practice their beliefs, but they were even allowed to protest and
publicize the treatment of their fellow members just across the border. Hence, within this
example alone one can see that Jiang’s administration were adamant and relatively faithful to
their pledge of “One country, two systems” within a least the general principles of liberal
democratic freedoms. I argue this distinction is important because it once again reinforces the
notion that the party prioritizes stability more than political ideology or mere economic
incentive. Rather, as prior established, the party understood that the most rational course of
action, at least for the moment, was the stable economic growth for both regions no matter any
differences in political or ideological discourse.
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Therefore, the CCP’s capacity to accept limited democracy and its influences within the
Hong Kong handover, academic scholarship, and shifting policy represent the emphasis of the
era’s stability through the economy. As what will come to pass is the dramatic shift in
authoritative policy and ideology under its newest administration that put the economy to the
backseat in favor of control.
Historical Point 3: Hong Kong Protests, 2019-2020
Just like the prior historical points, what matters more within this work is not the
historical points in isolation but the culmination of events, like changes in policy, ideology, or
leadership, which come to define the era. On that note, the Hong Kong 2019-2020 Protests will
serve as the most current and relevant discussion within this work. Though Hong Kong has a
long history of protest culture even before its handover in 1997 and has such developed its own
unique cultural values separate from the mainland; I argue that it was this most recent protest,
and the policies that were enacted despite them, that best envision the modern state of the PRC
under Xi Jinping.
These Protests began early 2019 with the intent to stop the passing of the Fugitive
Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matter Legislation Bill 2019 or more
commonly known as the Hong Kong Security Bill. This Bill, backed by Beijing, was viewed by
many within Hong Kong as a shallow veneer to allow the arrest and deportation to the mainland
of whoever the Beijing government deemed to be criminal. Thus, by deportation to the mainland
the criminal would then be further subjected directly to the Chinese court systems instead of
Hong Kong’s, thereby undermining the original intent of the “one country, two systems” motto.
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Though initially revoked by Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam, a position that many
would also refer to being a shallow veneer for Beijing authority as the position is selected by the
mainland, demands by protestors escalated. Tensions between both Hong Kong police backed by
Beijing and protesters would further grow over the next year. Within that time the largest of
these tensions arguably grew from mass allegations of police brutality and the storming of the
Hong Kong Legislative Council by protestors. At its peak, though official numbers are debated,
Hong Kong protestors marching in the streets numbered “nearly 2 million”, a quarter of the
city’s entire population!63
This mass popular protest, or its national coverage, was not to continue in its prior vigor
however, as the beginning of Covid-19 epidemic took center stage in early 2020. With this
lessoning traction Beijing quickly took action and enacted the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
which allowed the establishment of a Beijing backed security branch directly within Hong Kong.
This security branch bypassed the need for deportation all together and spelled an end for the
original intent of the “one country, two systems” motto. This has led to the current, as of 2021,
silence of Hong Kong as Beijing security branch has quickly worked to arrest any activists who
had involvement within the protests, most especially for those who took leadership positions for
the event. This silencing has gone on further to arrest those who were indirectly involved like
Hong Kong journalists and alleged “pro-democratic” (anti-Chinese) publications.
With an awareness of the general events revolving around the protests themselves it is
important to now turn to the broader questions; why did this happen and why did it happen now?
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As this work has attempted to make evident the most foretelling answer to these questions can be
found within the PRC’s leadership. I specifically referring to that of Xi Jinping and his
predominate rise to power since his inauguration in 2012 after the step down of his predecessor
Hu Jintao. This rise to power, though gradual, was most foretelling 2017 with the incorporation
of his “Xi Jinping Thought” into the constitution of the CCP and its eventual incorporation into
the PRC constitution a year later.64 Xi’s adamant push of his “Xi Jinping Thought” which dictate
his “Four-Pronged Comprehensive Strategy” outlined his future strategy for the nation. 65 As
noted within the beginning of this work however, what is important is not the rhetoric of CCP
but its actions. Hence, within this case in particular, I argue that Xi’s push of his ideological
thought makes further sense when viewed within the lens of how it has come to further shape the
CCP and PRC stability within the modern era. I argue that this “shaping” is most prominent, for
this work, within three roles. These roles are the removal of his presidential term limit, the
reforming of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), and the further push of PRC’s Military Civil
Fusion Strategy (MCF).
Constitutional Changes
Before I move on to the define the importance of the shaping of the PLA or term limit
however, it is important to first understand the significant impact of instating constitutional
changes. Since the current Constitutions creation by Deng Xiaoping administration in 1982 there
have only been sparce moments within its history in which it has been edited; with only ever
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being changed in three other National Congress meetings held once every five years.66
Scholarship acknowledges that this incorporation of “Xi Jinping Thought” within the
constitution and throughout CCP rhetoric is a significant departure from Xi’s predecessors, as it
moves away from Deng Xiaoping’s “normative framework of power succession “ that had been
established since his departure from office.67 It is significant because it is understood that it was
Deng’s intent to not recreate the “centralization of political power” and “cult of personality” of
the Mao era. 68 Hence, Xi’s departure from this rhetoric shows the dissolving of Deng’s gradual
shift to “collective leadership system based on consensus building, power-sharing and a
mechanism for orderly succession” that he had hoped to permanently establish within the party
after his death.69
Additionally, and unlike his predecessors as well, is the inclusion of his own name into
the rhetoric and now constitution. By doing this Xi has “further exalted his status to that of Mao
and Deng, as they were the only exception to” this unspoken rule.70 What will be found to be the
repeating theme around Xi is his shift of PRC and CCP rhetoric that coincide with consolidation
of power and departure from his predecessors; it is a theme that can be interpreted within
democratization theory as shift from a single party regime into a personalistic regime.

66

(Constitution of the people's republic of china. (n.d.). Retrieved April 04, 2021, from
http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html)
67
Jash, Amrita. “Xi Jinping’s Control of the Chinese Army.” Strategic Analysis 42, no. 6 (2018), 641.
68
(Ibid.) – Additionally, I understand there is debate on that premise as Deng’s control of the administration after his
retirement did not bode well for notion of clean transitions of leadership…however one could argue that his
establishment of the constitutional foundations and fear of the party moving away from this premise were his central
reasonings…
69
(Ibid.)
70
(Ibid.)

38

Xi’s Reforms
The first point of Xi’s shaping of the CCP and PRC has been through the removal of the
presidential term limit. This removal was done by a unanimous push through the National
People’s Congress (NPC) in 2018 and forwent the traditional root of the office’s predecessors
since Deng Xiaoping. Hence, rather than forgoing official power and dealing with the traditional
power dynamics struggle of the inner CCP, like instating a direct subordinate or heir, Xi has
removed it all together. This action by Xi is representative of three distinct points. First, Xi is
reinstating his supremacy within the party and quelling any doubts about his factions power.
Second, by doing this Xi is simultaneously helping to secure his own position as his removal is
now only possible from nothing less than a coup or complete elimination of his power, leaving
him only as figurehead. Lastly, instating himself as President for life is a display of intent and
power not only internally but externally. It can be understood that by Xi’s choice to officially
indefinite his term limit he is stating to the West that he no longer intends to display a veneer of
democratic institutions, or rather that he no longer must as his administrations priority is centered
on control instead of the economy. While no doubt there are further extrapolations that can be
taken from his decision, these three points are the most precedent, as these points insure internal
security and display external intent; principle foundations to his party’s stability through control.
On the point of security and the prospect of removal however, since the Mao era there
has always been an acknowledgment from within the CCP that the “Party must command the
gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.”71 This perspective encapsulated
in Mao’s notion that “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”72 and has since been
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generally followed within the CCP but has significantly lapsed since Mao. This belief is reflected
in the fact that constitutionally the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) swears allegiance to the CCP
and not the PRC. Or rather more plainly, constitutionally within the nation the military swears
loyalty to the Communist Party not the people. In Xi’s plight to secure power however, he has
gone beyond his predecessors and moved even further than this, hence the second point.
This point is encapsulated in Xi’s 2016 issued guideline within the Central Military
Commission for “Deeping Military Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces” which
sought to more closely tie CCP loyalty and ideology to the PLA. Xi did this for three primary
reasons. First, as addressed prior, Xi understood that control of the PLA was central in security
of the party both internally and externally. Second, there was gradual growing of “lack of
ideological commitment to the CCP and rampant corruption from within the PLA” that Xi saw as
detrimental to the future of the CCP. Third, and most important, unlike his predecessors “while
Xi has further strengthened the power and authority of the CCP, he also made the party
subservient to his leadership by taking charge of the top offices of both the party and the
military.” Historically however top official offices within the CCP do not necessarily constitute
dominate power within the CCP, and thus Xi’s decision to place himself as head of the PLA
alongside his top position within the CCP is a double “check” that helps to keep both party and
military in line while under supervision.73
This new invigoration of control of the PLA under Xi has also been in combination with
the last role, the renewed emphasis on Civil Military Fusion within the PRC. Though the term is
relegated as a broader coverage of multiple policies and reforms it has been defined as a goal to
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“promote deeper integration of China’s civilian and defense economies,” with the “intent to
create and leverage synergies between economic development and military modernization.”74
Hence, its objective, like the prior roles discussed, is the strengthening of CCP through increased
control. While research on the subject notes that Xi is not the first to implement such policies, as
“pursing MCF in some form has been around since at least the early 1980s,” it is under Xi that
the most recent and significant of these policies was pushed.75 This policy, while in combination
of other Xi policies like his Xi Jinping Thought discussed prior, was incorporated into CCP’s
constitution during the 19th CCP National Congress in 2017. 76
Though research is hesitant to delegate this push of MCF in 2017 as having already been
fully integrated within 2020, as there is in fact research that suggests “(civilian) companies can
and do resist requests, or, at the very least, drag their feet when complying with (Governmental)
orders they see as contrary to their commercial interests,” it is apt to note that “Xi’s high-level
attention and the PLA’s genuine demand for emerging technologies from the commercial
enterprises may lead to noteworthy breakthroughs” against Western interests. 77 Therefore, the
mere fact that Xi has recently further pushed this strategy outline within the CCP Constitution
again highlights his administrations central focus on control; this is most especially through the
direct revisioning and modernizing of the PLA’s ideological loyalties and technological capacity.
The historical moment of 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests, and Xi’s push of authoritative
legislation throughout the PRC, serve as symbolic representation to not only Xi’s forward
approach to political control but his leaderships position on democracy. Instead of adhering to
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the original Hong Kong motto or his predecessor’s stances on centralization of power, Xi
directly chose to instate his vision of the PRC that is centered to the party. Hence, unlike his
predecessors Xi has forgone trying to appease Western powers or focus stability solely through
the economy and has instead chosen to favor national interests. It could thus be understood that
Xi saw the central focus on the stability through the economy as a detriment to the party. It was a
detriment because relying solely on the continued growth and stability of the PRC was a risk, for
if the nation were to faulter the party and its very basis for legitimacy would be put into question.
Therefore, Xi’s answer was control. By placing the nation under the further jurisdiction and
surveillance of the party, even if the nation’s economy were to faulter the authoritative state
would be able to weather the storm if need be. It should then be understood that within this era
whether the storm be a riled populace or Western democratic influences, by means of stability
through control, Xi sees his decisions in both Hong Kong and throughout the PRC as beneficial
to the goals of securing the future of the party, and guiding the nation to its historical place as the
global hegemon.
Under the historical eras represented by the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, Hong
Kong transfer of 1997, and Hong Kong Protests of 2019-2020 the theme of party decisions on
stability, or rather more accurately elite choices, takes center stage. Within 1989 the stability of
the party was faltering as an internal factional split, divided on the future of the nation,
threatened the party’s role. The Tiananmen Protests then served as a catalyst for this division
with the outcome shaping the nation for the decades to come. Within 1997 the party understood
that they could not escape change but knew that they would not allow dramatic political reform
as they did not intend to relinquish significant power or repeat what had happened to their Soviet
counterparts. Realizing that much of the turmoil of the prior era’s reform rested on the failure of
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the severely limited economic restructuring and the legitimacy that economic growth represents,
dramatic change within this era comes to be represented by the party’s focus on stability through
the economy. The most recent Hong Kong Protests of 2019-2020 and the era it represents
highlights the steady rise of elite choice within the nation and shift away from central focus of
the economy. Rather, within this era dramatic centralized control as the key to stability of the
nation has taken hold. Within each of these eras however, though stability of party and nation is
center stage, it is plain to see the drastic difference in its interpretation. Therefore, it is important
to understand within modernity that, unlike the prior eras, due to the current interpretation of
stability on emphasis of control the likelihood we are to see any reverse by allowing aspects of
democratization is far grimmer than it has been in decades.
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CHAPTER IV: DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS PROSPECTS IN CHINA
Now with a solid understanding of the broad history of the PRC since the 1980s and its
general shifts that make up party ideology and factionalism, the work now returns to the topic of
democratization. The following work looks at key components within the PRC that effect the
process of democratization, limitations within the system, and finally the future prospects of
democracy in the PRC.
As noted prior, within the 1980s to early 2000s the notion of the democratizing PRC was
an avid discussion within Chinese scholarship. Though scholars did not predict the rise of Xi and
his advance to a more authoritative PRC their work still has merit. In fact, the mere reality that
the literature was being created and published as compared to its stringent restrictions in
modernity is quite informative. This is because as of 2013 the PRC’s “Office of the Central
Committee” issued a direct outline of seven topics in which the intellectual community was not
to discuss. The first topic, and one especially relevant to this very work, Chinese intellectuals
were not to discuss the “promotion of Western constitutional democracy, as it negates the
features of the Chinese socialist system.” Second, they should not discuss “universal values, as it
shakes the party’s ideological and theoretical foundations.” Third, they should not discuss “civil
society, as it undermines the social basis of the ruling party.” Fourth, discussion of
“neoliberalism” is forbade because it “attempts to change China’s economic system.” Fifth,
discussion on “promotion of press freedom” was barred as it “challenged the principles of party
control over press and publications.” Sixth, discussion on “historical nihilism” and “party errors”
was forbade as well as it was deemed that it “sought to distort the historical role of the CCP.”
Seventh and last, it prohibited the “questioning of reform and opening up and the socialist nature
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of the system with Chinese characteristics” as they were deemed to be “denying the party’s line
and principles.”78
In keeping with the view that actions speak louder than words, in politics no less than in
international relations, I argue by the fact that this 2013 outline by the PRC vehemently silenced
Chinese scholarship on the aforementioned subjects it would fall into the former and not be
merely rhetoric of the party. Further, I argue an important highlight that can be read from these
seven barred topics is that one can come to understand not only the discourse the CCP intended
to smother, but the general direction they intended to steer the nations scholarship as well.
Hence, since this proclamation under the Xi administration, Chinese political scholarship from
within PRC advocating even the notion of democratization or Western values has become highly
stigmatized.
It is not only scholarship that shares in these restrictions. It also extends to the internet.
As during Hu Jintao’s and Xi’s administrations the internet came to further highlight the CCP’s
dramatic fear of dissemination of unregulated knowledge and influence. This fear stemmed from
the fact that the internet had the ability to break the “long tradition of managing information
flows to ensure that the party is the primary, if not sole, provider of information.” Additionally,
this fear was significantly unique as it was a new frontier of censorship as a whole, in that the
party could not simply look to Soviet methods and revision it for the PRC as the nation never had
to deal with internet media, thus the CCP was forced to navigate uncharted waters. Therefore,
since the early 2000s the PRC has pushed out different legislation, like its Great Firewall of
China or prison sentences for those who post “slanderous” content, with the intent to reign in on
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and monitor information and representation outside of the party’s influence. This reigning in on
however has only been expanded since its earliest, now considered lax, legislation as the new
media has come under further control. For example, Xi was quoted in an interview in 2013 as
stating that the internet is “now the major battlefield of public opinion” and that “it is important
to construct a powerful Internet army to gain control of it.” Since then, what this come to
represent is that total control and repression on open media and internet access for the vast
majority of the Chinese populace; this is most especially apparent within the realm of access to
Western soft power influences like democratization.79
Through these new forms of censorship and control what has come to further flourishing
within CCP Xi rhetoric is the association of democratization as a Western ideal that undermines
not only the CCP but the PRC. This is because under the CCP ideology there is no country
without the party, and thus to associate a China with democracy is in itself anti-Chinese. While
not a creation of Xi himself, as the notion of the party being inseparable from the country has
long been a dictum of party rhetoric, it is particularly more important under Xi. Through the
combination of the historical blurring of lines between country and party now mixed with Xi’s
new creation of blurring the party and himself, he has further cemented the inseparability of Xi
from the PRC. Therefore, Xi, much by his own creation has made himself the face of the nation.
Limitations and Resistances of Current PRC to Democratic Change
Now with a more thorough understanding of the PRC system as a whole, I believe it is
important to briefly address limitations of democratization within the nation’s current structure,
in an effort to both quell expectations and be aware of barriers within.
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First, is the nominal understanding on the different role and influence that leadership has
within the PRC as compared to the West. For example, the important distinction and
understanding of the top institutional governmental apparatus as well as the term Paramount
Leader. First, though constitutionally the largest power is centralized within the National
People’s Congress (NPC) and their national meetings held once every five years, the de facto
reality is that “power lies within the Political Bureau or Politburo.”80
Since the Politburo’s early creation in the Maoist era, it has been the centralization of the
nation’s top power, and unlike the 2,270 delegates of the NPC the Politburo has historically
never been comprised of more than 25 members. Even within this membership however it is the
Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo’s “inner cabinet,” where the true heads of PRC
direct the nation. Within the standing committee membership is comprised of the General
Secretary, Premier, heads of state Commissions, and similar top leadership. Though beyond the
general makeup of its leadership even scholarship on the subject notes that “little about the actual
workings of the committee are known expect for the fact that meetings are frequent, and that
discussion is said to be unrestrained.” This unknown stretches even to the jurisdiction of the
politburo authority as the constitutional statues “give no idea about the extent of the powers.”
The only ‘knows’ being that they are elected by the Commission underneath, they “convene the
sessions of said committee,” and that they exercise “function and power” when is not in session.
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Thus, for all intents and purposes it should be understood that for those within the Politburo,
especially the Standing committee, their power within the PRC is absolute.81
Second, the term paramount leader is one specifically used within the case of the PRC
that describes the “true” leader of the party despite official position. While originally first used
within the case of Deng Xiaoping, as he directly influenced the nations course after his
retirement in 1989, the term has since then also been associated with others like Jiang Zemin and
currently Xi Jinping. Within the case of Xi however, he has forgone the indirect power dynamic
struggle and chosen to extend his position indefinitely. This power struggle within the CCP is
often seen in means like lobbying to putting ones proteges within the Politburo, or within the
case of Jiang Zemin, putting loyal members of his factions high within the leadership of the
Peoples Liberation Army.82 For Xi however, while he has more fully consolidated official power
he has made a significant departure from his predecessors and put the PRC as a whole under
further authoritative control.83 In short it is important to understand that though a figure may be
seated on the highest positions within the CCP, General Secretary or Chairman of Military, they
are not necessarily the leader. This distinction is important to note because it helps to highlight
the general levels of opaqueness and centralized control when it comes to the party’s faculties or
rhetoric, and further extrapolates the difficulties of democratic transition. Additionally,
principally within the case of Xi, his official placement in multiple top positions serves to further
highlight the current administrations emphasis on centralized control and break from prior
norms.
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Third, Xi’s securing of his own political position has also been directly backed up by his
official “anti-corruption” campaign that has been ongoing since late 2012.84 While within this
work I do not intend to go into depth further on party factionalism the campaign official numbers
as of only 2018 were already “sweeping up some 2 million” CCP officials by Xi’s administration
of “both high and low rank.” 85 To Xi, internal corruption within the PRC is an internal blight
that, unless taken control of, threatens not only the party’s power but his own. This is because
through means of corruption, like bribery or amassing wealth, it “allows for the creation of
alternative centers of power within the state.”86 Therefore, it should be understood that vast
majority of the anti-corruption is removal of “political foes” not only to consolidate power but to
defend it. This goes for both the military and party as these campaigns are combined with Xi’s
stringent policy push for “the Party’s absolute leadership over the PLA”. 87 Hence, it should be
acknowledged that Xi is keenly aware of internal factionalism within the party, and actively
ready to remove those who pose a threat to his rule.
Fourth, and quite similar to prior’s enforcement of internal policy through anti-corruption
campaigns, is the central importance of internal legitimacy. While it is common to assume state
legitimacy of a regime is centered on its perspective to the populace, in how its populace views
the legitimacy of its leaders, scholarship is apt to acknowledge the importance it has to its
internal elites. Rather, that “legitimacy is crucial to even the most unjust and bloody-minded
dictatorships…as a lack of legitimacy among the population as a whole does not spell a crisis of
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legitimacy for the regime unless it begins to infect the elites tied to the regime itself.”88 In
particular the scholarship acknowledges that it is the “those that hold the monopoly of coercive
power” within the state “such as the ruling party, the armed forces, and the police.”89 Hence, by
looking at Xi’s corruption campaigns and centralizing of control of both party and military as
means of continuously reinforcing his own administration’s legitimacy, it can be understood just
how significantly Xi fears internal party instability.
Fifth, and something often less addressed, is the general principle of the infallibility of
the party and its decisions. Because of this infallibility, to double back on the changes within the
Xi administration, even for top officials from within the party, is relatively unthinkable. This is
because it is not only possible but common to lay blame on “tigers and flies,” or rather both
upper and lower-level officials within CCP for scandals or corruption. To lay blame on Xi’s
direct faction however, who no less have been leading the “anti-corruption” campaigns, would
be admitting to powerful faults at the party’s core.90
This is in combination with the fact that there is a general “vulnerability” within the party
when there are large scale disputes due to “overdependence on personal relationships” as it has
“ramifications throughout the system.”91 These ramifications materialize themselves in the form
of “large scale purges” like what is witnessed under Xi. These purges split lines and create a
“wrong party” who are deemed to have “deceived other party members and the masses and led
the party away from its correct line.”92 Even further, there are party fears that continued rampant
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crackdown can have the counter effect of undermining the legitimacy of party; as they “increase
sentiment of many that the party has become intolerably corrupt and cannot reform itself,” thus
undermining the entire stability of the system. Hence, this why there are never admitted mistakes
by the central administration in charge, as when things go wrong it was not the fault of the
current administration but that of “wrong party” and their influence.93
Sixth, mentioned briefly prior, since the late 1970s the PRCs opening up policies, along
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the nation has moved away from much its original
Soviet, Marxist, and Maoist rhetoric. In moving away from this rhetoric the party hoped to free
itself from the original socialist dogma that many had perspective to bind the nation away from
the focus of national interest. Ironically however, in this party rhetoric to free itself from its
foundational binds they stepped right into some of the original criticisms of Marxist thought.
More specifically, the original contradiction that the foundational Communist state is
merely a “transitional device for achieving total liberation of the people,” and that once it does so
the current “pseudo-popular state,” the one that is deemed “nothing but a highly despotic
government of the masses by a new and very small aristocracy of real or pretended scholars,”
will come abolish itself.94 When in fact, scholarship has argued a state such as this “can have no
other objective than to perpetuate itself, and that it can engender and nurture only slavery in the
people who endure it.”95 Thus, I would argue in PRC’s attempt to separate itself from its Marxist
origins it managed to further ingrain itself within some of its most foundational criticisms.
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Yet, simultaneously and seemingly conversely, while the CCP does fall into some of the
foundational criticisms of Marxism, it is necessary within discourse to acknowledge that the
modern PRC is principally communist in name only. Rather, when viewing prospects for
democratization it is important to not fall into the trap of believing that the political ideology
would be shifting from communism to democracy. For example, within the modern PRC Marxist
communism has become so much of a shallow veneer that in August of 2018 over 50 University
students in Beijing were arrested after members of Marist student groups were trying to “help
organize workers” at a blue-collar welding equipment factory in the city of Shenzhen. While this
was not an isolated occurrence, as parallel cases have popped up since, this incident occurred just
few months after bicentennial of Marx’s birth, in which Xi stated that “As Communists, we
should incorporate Marxist classics and principles into our lifestyle and treat Marxism as a
spiritual pursuit.” Hence, its important to understand that Marist communism is merely one of
the CCP’s means of legitimacy and social order by portraying the party as representative of the
people; as whenever this portrayal is questioned or Marxism is actual acted upon the rhetoric is
silenced.96
Consequently, while the nation no doubt shares in similar characteristics with communist
states, such as centralized state ownership, it is important to readily acknowledge the ideological
shifts the nation has seen since the original Maoist era when attempting to view it under
democratization theory. As under Deng’s reforms of late 1970s and Xi’s reforms since 2012 the
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nation has significantly shifted to a hybridist regime of relatively open capitalist economy and
increasingly restrictive political ideology all under an authoritative surveillance state.97
Therefore, through these six examples alone, it already begins to become blatantly
apparent just what is truly asked when the notion of a democratizing PRC comes up. With the
current ideologically authoritative make-up of the PRC and the level of control of its leadership
being its foremost influential negators of the democratization process.
On Reality of Democratization in the PRC
Now with an understanding of the PRC’s history, makeup of the CCP, and internal
limitations over these last decades it is now time to turn back to the foundational theory and
fundamental question of the work; why hasn’t the PRC democratized? As addressed within the
beginning of this work, the primary trends that I look at under democratization theory for the
PRC are the apolitical Chinese populace who break from the democratic norms of civic culture,
the lack of political freedoms despite the significant economic opening up and formation of
middle class, and the hybrid nature of the PRC that has shifted back and forth from emphasis of
single party state to personalistic regime. Each of these points represent three central concerns to
positive correlations at democratization of the PRC.
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The first concern is the apolitical Chinese populace who break from the democratic
norms of civic culture. As it is civic culture which is needed to “maintain the delicate balance
required by a democratic system in which citizens recognize and obey the authority of governing
elites while also pressuring them to be responsive and accountable.”98 Therefore, because the
Chinese populace is apolitical, due to the narrative of rational ignorance that is pushed, they only
follow the first aspect of the democratization trend. Rather, Chinese citizens “recognize and obey
the authority of governing elites,” but they in large do not “pressure them to be responsive and
accountable” as the average citizen alone stays apolitical.99 Even if they were to break from this
norm and chose to be political however, the average citizen holds no political power and would
be punished if they made to much confrontation. Thus, not only has CCP control of the rule of
law and information made it difficult to be political outside of state nationalism, but you are
punished if you do so anyway.
The second concern, a quite similar to the first, lack of political freedoms despite open
economy and growth of the middle class, is due to three primary reasons. First, since the late
1970s, and the introduction of Deng Xiaoping’s economic opening up of the nation, the Chinese
people have been steadily moving away from the economic hardships they suffered under the
cultural revolution of Maoist era. Second, what this has in turn allowed is the rapid growth of the
nation and the creation of a new middle class, with access to luxuries and accommodations that
were unthinkable few decades prior. Thus, by gaining access to said luxuries said middle class is
now supportive of the system that provided it. Third, now with the general support of a
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significant portion of the nation’s populace the steady increase of authoritative policy, that was
always nominally in place, is not questioned. Therefore, by combination of an increasingly
authoritarian regime with a populace that is in broad support of the system at large, you create
the unique trend that can be seen within the modern PRC.
The third and last concern revolves around the hybrid nature of the PRC that has shifted
back and forth from emphasis of single party state to personalistic regime. It is this last
democratization trend that most directly benefits to the understanding of the historical eras of the
nation. One could argue, that within the 1970s of the PRC, Deng’s economic and political shift
of the nation facilitated the regime away from the personalistic regime of the Maoist era into a
single party state; while also having nominal Western frameworks such as transitions of
authoritative power and similar constitutional foundations. Since Deng’s death however, while
there was a slow general shift to further forms of authoritarian control as well as continued
faction infighting, the nation continued to follow in his objective of a consolidated single party
regime. This shift was not to last though, as Xi’s stringent implementation of centralization of
power has completely broken from his predecessors. Because of this shift of emphasis of single
party state to personalistic, Xi has begun to engrain the cult of personality of the Maoist era once
again into the PRC. Thus, by centralization of power, the democratization trends of personalistic
regimes begin to take precedence over the prior single party state. For example, within
personalistic regimes it is far more “likely to be replaced by a new dictatorship than by a
democracy,” and that the regime is “more likely to be overthrown in revolutions, civil wars,
popular uprisings, or invasions.”100 This is wholly unlike single party states who “when they see
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the writing on the wall, put great effort into negotiation of electoral institutions” to best serve the
ease of transition and safety for themselves.101 The indoctrination of Xi’s political thought and
removal of his term limit however has erased previous modes of succession and divisions of
power.Thus, following trends in democratization theory, I argue Xi’s new emphasis of a
personalistic regime has shifted the future of PRC beyond his administration into an arguably
even more unstable path. His emphasis of centralized control is something the country has not
seen since Mao, and the current prospects of democratization are just as grim.
Through the combination of an evolving centralized authoritative state directly
controlling the influence of all Western soft power, with a large portion of the population who
economically benefited from the regime system, and thus have no interest in these influences, the
notion of a democratizing PRC within the relative future, beyond complete and dramatic shift in
administrations, is relatively unthinkable.
Conclusion
The transition across the historical eras since the 1980s shows us a transformation of not
only party leadership, but CCP’s evolving understanding of stability across each decade. This
evolving understanding of stability within each era from acceptance of change, to priority
economy, and last importance of control have shown to be the significant influences to party
ideology and the nation at large.
Within 1989, student protests materialized for many within the party inner fears of not
only challenges to their leadership, but of the significant divisions within the party itself. The

101

(Ibid.)

56

party and its grip of the nation was not as stable as many thought it to be. Hence, we can come to
understand the party’s lashing out at what it saw as those who undermined that stability, as well
as the acceptance that there must be change if they are not to repeat themselves.
The transfer of Hong Kong in 1997, the acceptance of the “One Country, two systems”
motto, and the influx of democratic scholarship within the nation after the fall of the Soviet
Union reflect the growth of its priority of the economy. Rather, that because the PRC accepted
the Western influences that the original Hong Kong motto and open scholarship represented, this
era reflects that transitional understanding that the economy comes first if its policy does not
directly undermine stability of the party.
Conversely, the Hong Kong protests in 2019-2020, redefining of the one country, two
systems motto, silencing of scholarship, constitutional incorporation of Xi Jinping Thought,
removal of term limit, push of MCF, total control of the PLA, and more have all come to
symbolize the stringent shift from the prior era’s central emphasis of the economy. Within Hong
Kong alone this shift has come to represent the understanding that Xi Jinping now sees the
original deal made under the prior administration, and the Western influence that it represents, as
unbalanced. It can be understood that the current CCP administration no longer intends to, or
rather that it no longer has to, display a veneer or even entertain the idea of a democratizing or
democratic institution. Xi’s priority of control and centralization of power have come to define
the current era of the PRC and represent his personal understanding of the nation’s, as well as the
party’s, best path to stability.
What Hong Kong’s future holds cannot be said, however one can assume that if they are
to continue along a similar disposition under the Xi administration there will be no difference
between it and other PRC provinces when it comes to authoritative control. As long as the Xi

57

administration holds power, the prospects of democratizing China is inconceivable. Though
scholarship on the discussion is apt to note the democratic prospects pointed to by the existence
of the National People’s Congress and the possibilities it could hold, until substantial
institutional change occurs the NPC will remain a rubber stamp committee.
Nevertheless, as I noted within the beginning of this work, my intent was never to
demonize political systems nor to advocate anti-democratic rhetoric. It must be said, however,
that the authoritative and internationally aggressive path that the current PRC has taken, though
perhaps leading it in the direction of the nation’s end goal of retaking its place as the global
hegemon, is isolating itself on the global stage. Beyond discourse on the nations perceived
largest aggressor, the United States, or even what has been discussed within this work the PRC’s
international dialogue has become increasingly confrontational under Xi. Even the relationship
with its Asian neighbors is in constant tension, especially with the growing concern in
sovereignty and jurisdictional boundaries within the South China Sea. Within the case of Africa,
concerns of large scale Chinese infrastructural investment as covers for Chinese work
immigration, rapid securing of raw resources, and dept trap diplomacy have economically
damaged developing regions. Highly aggressive nationalist rhetoric on the reunification of
Taiwan and the dramatic increase in PLA Naval drills within the region only serve to further
emphasize the issue.
No country or administration is free of its ridicule yet concerns over the rampant growth
of PRC’s presence in international realm, with the sole aggressive intent of its own national
interest, is a growing concern. What the future holds for the nation, even beyond its nominal
possibilities of democratization, is unknown; only that if the current path that the PRC has taken
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is to continue there are seemingly only two likely outcomes each based on the stance taken by
not only the currently effected nations but the international stage at large.
For the first outcome, an equivalently defiant stance from most influential effected
nations is taken against the PRC’s economic and military coercion; choosing instead to
reestablish international trade and defense treatise to the overall detriment of the PRC. As is the
current intention of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or QUAD, a coalition of between the
U.S, Japan, India, and Australia with the central intention of limiting the PRC’s influence within
East Asia. Only time will tell of its effectiveness as the official coalition is in its infancy and
international pressures from the PRC on the individual member states are contending against
rhetoric within the pact. Therefore, like the QUAD, this process of defiance would not be quick,
and it would be expected that the PRC would equally raise its international pressure to confront
what it would perceive is a strangle hold to the nation. How long the CCP could keep the nation
stabilized under growing international sanctions or regulations is unknown, as though Xi has
further subjected the nation and the party under his ideology and control, much of the legitimacy
of the party comes from the economic stability and growth of the nation. It would thus be
expected that this international pressure would in turn rapidly increase nationalist and militarist
rhetoric within the nation, with the party further leaning on the notion of foreign intervention and
century of humiliation, which would likely be a means of significant stabilizing power for the
party, at least momentarily. If not careful however, the conditions of Germany after the first
World War would tell us what industrious and internationally isolated nation riled up on the
rhetoric of nationalism and militarism can create. Hence, within this path, if not treaded
carefully, international isolation my force the party to believe militaristic intervention is the only
option.
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While one might argue that in order to tread carefully and not create the analogous
conditions of Germany after first World War within this outcome, a clear line must be set on the
separation of the party and Chinese people. I argue this would likely be futile. It would be futile
as those most effected by a seemingly isolated PRC would be those very people, hence even if
they were to learn of this outside distinction of party and people within the PRC, why would they
believe discourse from nations who have put them in this very hardship. Rather, I would argue
that the most realistic possibility that does not involve international militaristic intervention is the
creation of the clear line of separation between Xi’s administration and the party as a whole.
Therefore, instead of the expectation of an apolitical or nationalistic populace internally shifting
the nation, international dialogue would make it clear that it is the current authoritative direction
the nations leadership has taken and not the party itself. This in turn would create the possibility
to cause further internal pressure against more authoritative path of the party and lean it in a
direction back to Deng Xiaoping’s more open policies of the 1980s, who most within the PRC
still readily acknowledge as the modernizer of the nation. With Xi’s centralization of power in
the recent years however how this internal factionalism would playout out is unknown, but as
long as the realization within the party that international sphere’s actions are due to the nation’s
current direction and not the party itself the possibility of peaceful coalition of the PRC under the
Communist Party and international realm at large remains.
For the second outcome, instead of defiant stance from all or most, the majority remain
indecisive or indifferent believing it does not concern their nation or it is an issue for larger
global powers. Within this outcome economic or military coercion from the PRC is at least
nominally accepted, and through this the nation slowly but continuedly gains influence within
the international realm as nations are coerced or persuaded individually. This continued gain
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with the international realm then begins to directly compete with United States current position
as the global hegemon, and further pressures the U.S to either take military and economic action
or withdraw influence within current strategic U.S backed regions. Inaction is not an option, as
PRC’s presence within these regions would be seen by allies as weakness or faulting promises of
U.S security. For example, within the South China Sea, rapid increase in PRC’s confrontation
over international jurisdictions claims with its smaller neighbors have increased calls for U.S
allied support; with the perception that lack of said support prior was forcing the hands of the
smaller neighbors to lean closer to accommodating the PRC’s jurisdictional claims. Thus, at least
within the realm of democracies, if the international realm chooses instead to accommodate and
accept the new PRC, the nation will no doubt soon find its place back as the global hegemon to
the detriment of democracy everywhere. Within this possibility it is not far off to look back to
the cold war’s bipolarity of two politically oppositional monoliths within the world; each
monolith igniting proxy wars over fear of all out military conflict.
In the end, with all signs pointing to the ever increasingly authoritative nature of PRC for
the foreseeable future, there is still room for debate. For even in the last years of the Soviet
Union, much of Western scholarship readily acknowledged socialist monolith just as influential,
stable, and seemingly eternal as they did decades prior. For example, within on August 1st 1989,
just after the Tiananmen Incident, Henry Kissinger wrote an article addressing the need not to
isolate and punish China as “the United States needs China as a possible counterweight to Soviet
aspirations in Asia” 102Hence, even though in hindsight scholars now know the Soviet system
was breaking at the seams and would fully crumble under its own weight two years later,

102

Kissinger, Henry. “THE CARICATURE OF DENG AS A TYRANT IS UNFAIR.” The Washington Post. WP
Company, August 1, 1989, 1.

61

scholarship of the period failed to predict it. Could the same be said of the PRC? Francis
Fukuyama argued in 1992 that “Western confidence in the stability of Soviet communism rested
on a belief, conscious or not, that the Russian people were not interested in or ready for
democracy,” something I argue about the Chinese populace within this very work.103 As much as
scholarship can point to trends and make predictions even the best of it cannot predict the future.
The best hope when looking far beyond modernity is being general with our predictions and
acknowledging that there will be both foreseeable and unforeseeable events that will influence
the course of Chinse history in unknown ways. People are ultimately unpredictable, why would
their history or their future be any different?
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